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The causes and implications  of the developing  The debt and debt-service  reduction  (DDSR)
country  debt crisis  - as well as its solution-  programs  implemented  so far under the Brady
all have an important  fiscal  dimension.  plan have  provided  only partial  solutions,  closing
without  eliminating  the gap between  the face
The crisis was triggered  by the widespread  value  of the extemal  debt and the present  value
perception  that the public sectors  in many  of prospective  public sector  debt service.  They
heavily indebted  countries  were effectively  have  done so partly by reducing  the former  and
insolvent  m the international  environment  of the  partly by increasing  the latter.
early l10s.  The actual fiscal response  to the
resulting  liquidity  crisis involved  increased  Their contribution  toward  easing  the imme-
reliance  on domesiic  financing,  the inflation  tax,  diate liquidity  problems  of the debtors  has not
and the curtailment  of public investment.  This  been  encouraging.  The amount  of debt relief
created  adverse  adjustment  incentives  for  embodied  in Brady  Plan programs  enacted  so far
policymakers  and resulted  in credit rationing,  has not in itself  been sufficient  to restore  fiscal
capital flight, assumption  of private  external  solvency.  Better-quality  fiscal adjustment  could
claims by the public sector,  and poor domestic  greatly  help improve  the situation.
investment  performance.
The most important  potential  contribution  of
Solutions  involve  restoring  fiscal health  such programs,  then,  may have been the reduc-
through  a combination  of debt relief and efficien.  tion  - through the policy conditionality  associ-
fiscal adjustment,  aimed at mitigating  the burden  ated with resources  provided  by the intemational
associated  with public  sector  debt service  and  financial  institutions  - of the secondary  burden
minimizing  the liquidity  problems  facing  the  associated  with the intemal  transfer  of resources
indebted  public sector.  to the public sector.
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ReferencesI. INTRODUCTION
Since the outbreak of the international debt crisis in 1982,
analysis  of  debt  issues  has  largely  been  conducted  from  a
perspective  that  considers external debt  as a  liability  of the
debtor country as a whole.  This approach pays little attention to
sectoral disaggregation  within  the debtor  country  itself.  The
problem  of  adjustment  is  interpreted  as a  balance  of  payments
issue,  and  the  policy  focus  is  on  conventional  short-run
macroeconomic  stabilization,  "getting  prices  right",  and
undertaking  longer-term  structural measures  designed  to promote
economic growth.
An  important  empirical  observation,  however,  is  that  the
overwhelming  majority  of  the  external  debt  outstanding  in  the
heavily-indebted developing countries at the time of the outbreak
of  the  international  debt  crisis  was  owed  by  these  countries'
public sectors.  As Table 1 indicates, about three quarters of the
total medium and long term gross external debt owed by the highly
indebted countries (HICs)  as a group in 1982 either repiesented a
direct  liability  of  the public  sector  or bore  a  public  sector
guarantee.  This suggests that approaching the crisis from a fiscal
perspective may yield insights that would tend to be obscured by
treating the debtor country as a single agent.  This paper argues
that fiscal phenomena have indeed played a key role in determining
the timing, breadth, and macroeconomic implications of the crisis.
Moreover, fiscal adjustment has a more fundamental role to play in
resolving the  macroeconomic problems associated with external debt
than would be inferred solely from its contribution to short-run
macroeconomic stabilization.  Specifically, the longer-term fiscal
implications of debt and debt-service reduction  (DDSR)  operations
under the Brady plan will be a primary determinant of the success
of these operations.
II. THE DEBT CRISIS AS A FISCAL PHENOMENON
It is helpful to begin by sorting out some conceptual issues.
The debt crisis  resulted in a  cutoff of private  lending to all
agents  in  the developing  countries  experiencing  debt  problems.
Suppose that we disaggregate such economies into public and private
sectors,  both  of  which  engage  in  financial  transactions  with
external agents.  If we adopt the perspective of Krugman (1988),  a
liquidity  problem  cannot  arise  for a  domestic  borrower  in  the
absence of a crisis of solvency.  In other words, as long as each
sector is perceived as able to repay, it would be able to attract
the foreign lending required to finance current account deficits.
In the absence of interactions between the domestic sectors, the
emergence of severe financial difficulties for either the public
sector or the private sector would result in a "fiscal crisis" or
a  "private financial  crisis", in which  one or the other  sector
would  be  denied  further  access  to  borrowing  by  its  private
creditors, but would not result in a "debt crisis" for the countryTable 1 : Heavily-Indebted Countries: Share of Public and
rublicly-Guaranteed Debt in Total Debt l/
1982  1988
Public  Total  Share  Pgblic  Total  Share
Argentina  15.9  27.1  58.6  47.5  49.3  96.4
Bolivia  2.8  3.0  95.7  4.1 --  4.3  95.9
Brazil  51.7  74.8  69.1  89.9  101.4  88.6
Chile  5.2  14.0  37.5  13.7  16.1  85.3
Colombia  6.0  7.2  83.4  13.8  15.4  90.0
Cote  d'Ivoire  5.1  ,6.2  81.4  7.9  11.6  68.2
Ecuador  3.9  5.5  70.5  9.0  9.1  98.7
Mexico  51.6  59.7  86.4  80.6  86.5  93.1
Morocco  10.2  10.5  97.6  19.4  19.6  99.0
Nigeria  9.1  10.4  87.4  29.3  29.9  98.2
Peru  7.0  8.6  80.7  12.5  13.9  89.8
Philippines  8.9  12.1  73.3  23.0  24.0  95.9
Uruguay  1.7  1.9  89.2  3.0  3.0  97.2
Venezuela  12.4  17.4  71.3  24.6  28.9  85.2
Yugoslavia  5.5  16.3  33.4  14.0  18.6  74.8
Total  HICs  196.9  274.8  71.7  392.5  431.9  90.9
1/ Totals  are  in millions  of US S; shares  are  in percent.
Source:  World  Debt  Tables,  1991-92.as a whole.
In practice, however, interactions between the two domestii
sectors will ensure that a sufficiently severe crisis of solvency
in one sector will spread to the other, reducing the profitability
of lending to all agents in the country.  More importantly, I argue
below  that whether  financial crises  originate  in the public  or
private sector, they are likely to manifest themselves in the form
of  perceired  public  sector  insolvency,  implying  that  fiscal
correction must play a key role in the resolution of the crisis.
A financial crisis  may directly originate in  the public sector
through a  change  of circumstances that  calls  into question  the
sector's future ability to service its debt.  However, insolvency
of the public  sector  is also  likely to contaminate  the private
sector  through fairly obvious mechanisms.  A  fiscal crisis will
create the need for additional revenues and/or spending cuts, and
may  even  result  in default on  the domestic  obligations  of  the
public  sector.  All  of  these may  have  adverse  effects  on  the
financial pos-tion of the private sector, and the anticipation of
such  adverse  effects  may  jeopardize  its  solvency  from  the
perspective of external creditors.
However, the financial health of the  public sector  may also be
threatened by crises that originate in the private sector, through
several mechanisms.  First, to the extent that a private sector
financial  crisis  results  in  a  slowdown  in  private  economic
activity, public revenues  (e.g.,  tax receipts or sales revenue of
public  enterprises) will be adve-sely affected.  Second, though
standard  commercial  risk  implies  that  individual  cases  of
bankruptcy will occur in the  private sector,  generalized insolvency
(i.e.,  a widespread financial crisis) is  unlikely in the absence of
major policy mistakes or particularly severe external shocks. 2 A
crisis  of  insolvency  in  the  private  sector  brought  about  by
inappropriate  public  policies  is  likely  to  result  in  strong
political pressures  for relief on the part of the most affected
private agents.  Finally, a widespread private crisis may engulf
the public  sector  less directly through the macro  stabilization
channel.  Countercyclical  spending or  tax relief,  transfers  to
distressed  private  concerns,  foreign  exchange  guarantees,  or
"nationalization" of private external debts, all undertaken in the
pursuit of  macroeconomic stabilization,  may ultimately threaten the
financial solvency of the public sector.
It  is  worth  noting  in  this  connection  that,  due  to  the
"nationalization" of private external debt,  the share of public
sector debt in the external debt of the heavily-indebted countries
increased markedly over the period between the outbreak of the debt
2  Calvo  (1989), for example, has documented how  "incredible
reforms" can lead to overborrowing by the private sector.
2crisis and the adoption of the Brady plan.  As Table 1 indicates,
by 1988  (the year  immediately preceding  the announcement of the
Brady plan) the share of public and publicly-guaranteed debt in the
total gross external debt of the HICs exceeded 90 percent.  Though
the extent to which this assumption of external liabilities by the
public  sector  represented  a  net transfer  to the private  sector
depends on the terms on  -'hich these liabilities were acquired, it
seems likely that in some co-rtries this transfer of liabilities
av.ided widespread bankruptcy in the private sector.
Whether the crisis originates in the  public or private sector,
then,  it is likely  to eventually be  internalized by  the public
sector  and  to  manifest  itself  in  the  form  of  public  sector
financial difficulties.  In effect, the political system ensures
that the losses associated with a financial crisis are allocated
through  the  public  sector,  and  public  sector  insolvency  is  a
symptom indicating that the allocation issue is  unresolved.  Since
the government has coercive power over private assets, the country
as a  whole will be unable to attract external funds as long as the
solvency  of the public  sector remains in question.  Moreover,
domestic residents will seek to avoid the burden of contributing to
the resolution of the country's fiscal problems by moving assets
abroad.  In this context, the restoration of  public sector solvency
becomes  the  sine qua non  for resolving  the country's  financial
crisis.
This means that overall current account adjustment is  neither
necessary nor sufficient to resolve the debt problem.  It is not
sufficient, because if adjustment takes the form of an improvement
in the  private sector's current account in the context  of sustained
public  sector  insolvency,  the  public  sector  can  service  its
external debt only by borrowing from the domestic private sector.
Unless credible fiscal adjustment takes place, however, domestic
creditors will be no more willing to finance the public sector than
will external creditors.  Thus, current account adjustment without
fiscal  adjustment  cannot  solve  a  public  sector  debt  problem.
Current account adjustment is also not necessary, because as long
as successful fiscal adjus-ment follows the nationalization of a
debt  problem  and  the public  sector  is perceived  as  solvent by
external  creditors, such creditors should be willing to finance
short-run  current account deficits  --  i.e., a  "foreign exchange
gap" would not emerge.  In short, when the debt to bE serviced is
public, the adjustment must ultimately be fiscal.
III. ORIGINS OF THE DEBT CRISIS IN INSOLVENCY OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
This section will make the empirical argument that the cutoff
in the flow of net lending from external creditors to the HICs in
the early  eighties  reflected a  sharp  reversal  in the perceived
ability of the public sectors in the HICs to service their debts on
market terms --  i.e., as argued in the previous section, from the
3perspective  of creditors the public  sectors in several of these
countries  indeed became  insolvent.  This  led to a  situation  in
which economic agents, both foreign and domestic, became reluctant
to acquire claims on the economi-s (not  just the public sectors) of
the HICs.  In turn, this reluctance manifested itself, among other
ways, in the cutoff of external private funding.
a. The Solvency Condition for the Public Sector
From the perspective of risk-neutral creditors, a debtor  will
be perceived to be solvent when the present value of its expected
future  debt  service  payments,  discounted  at  the  safe  rate  of
interest, is equal to the face value of the debtor's total debt 3.
Only in this case are the expected returns from lending to this
particular economic agent equal to the opportunity cost of funds,
and  only  in  this  case,  therefore,  will  both  new  and  existing
creditors  voluntarily  continue  to  finance  the  debtor.  This
condition  can  be  related  to  the  status  of  the  debtor's
comprehensive  balance  sheet 4. The  comprehensive  balance  sheet
includes  not  only  all  currently-existing  marketable  assets  and
liabilities  (which take the form of stocks), but also the present
value  (discounted at the safe interest rate) of all anticipated
future flows of receipts and payment obligations.  The capitalized
value of the former represents a current asset of the debtor, while
that of the latter is a current liability.  The difference between
the  value of the debtor's assets and liabilities,  with both defined
in this comprehensive fashion, is the debtor's comprehensive net
worth.  As long as net worth defined in this manner is nonnegative,
the debtor will be solvent, in the sense that the capitalized  value
of its resources is sufficient to liquidate its liabilities.
In the case of the  public sector of a  highly-indebted country,
straightforward  manipulation of the sector's  budget identity  can be
used to show (see  Buiter (1985))  that the resources devoted by the
public sector each period to the service of debt (both  interest and
amortization)  are  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  its primary  budget
surplus and its seignorage revenue 5. To see this, let D,  denote the
3  The  term  "safe rate  of  interest"  refers  to  the  rate  of
interest applicable to assets that are free of default risk, such
as US Treasury bills.
4  See Buiter  (1983),  as well as Guidotti and Kumar  (1991).
5 The equations that follow can be expressed in a number of
ways, depending on whether the income from public sector real and
financial assets is capitalized and thereby treated as the  value of
a stock, or as a flow.  Due to the absence of comprehensive data on
stocks of public sector assets, the flow  option is exercised below.
4total gross (external  and domestic) debt of the consolidated public
sector  at  time  t, it  the  "safe" nominal  interest  rate,  PSt the
public sector  primary (i.e.,  non-interest) surplus,  and IV the  stock
of base money 6. The public sector's flow budget constraint can then
be written as:
bt+kt=-PSt+i4t  (1)
That is, the overall deficit of the public sector  (consisting  of
the noninterest component -PSt  plus interest payments i,D,)  must be
financed either .y issuing debt  (D,)  or printing money  (M).  Th-.
can be rearranged as:
it  Dt-DtPSt+Mt  (2)
The left-hand side of this equation expresses total debt service as
the  sum  of  interest  payments  itpt  and  debt  amortization  (-D,).
Equation  (2) shows  that  this must  be  equal  to  the sum  of  the
primary  surplus PSt  and  seignorage  revenue Mt.  It follows that
public sector solvency holds at time t when the present value of
the expected primary surplus plus the expected seignorage revenue
over all future periods s  is greater than or equal to the face
value of the gross public sector debt:
PDV(  P5,+k,;  i8R,  t)  2Dt  3
For  present  purposes,  it  is  useful  to  rewrite  these
expressions in slightly different form.  Letting lower-case letters
denote ratios to nominal GDP (i.e.,  d=D/Py, m=M/Py, and ps=PS/Py,
where y is real GDP and P is the domestic price level), the public
sector budget constraint  (2)  becomes:
( rt-n.)  dt-d,=PSt+M_,t  4
where rt  is the real interest rate at time t and n,  is the rate of
growth of real GDP.  Similarly, the solvency condition can now be
written as:
6  For reasons described in footnote 2, PS includes interest
receipts on public sector financial assets, but excludes interest
on gross public debt.Pv(ps:+l@em  ;rt@nt,  t)  2dt
where  the  effective  discount  rate  is now  r,-n 1,  the  difference
between the real interest rate and the rate of growth of real GDP.
Given constant values of the ratio of the primary surplus and
seignorage to GDP, the preceding result implies that the present
value of  debt service payments will be infinite whenever the rate
of growth of  real GDP exceeds the real rate of interest.  This is
so because receipts from the issue of new debt would always be more
than sufficient  to service existing debt at  the market  rate of
interest without  increasing the debt/GDP  ratio.  In this case,
solvency  is  guaranteed  for  any  initial  finite  stock  of  debt,
regardless of the value taken by the sum of the primary surplus and
seignorage revenue.  In other words, when the rate of growth  of
real  GDP  exceeds  the  real  rate  of  interest,  the  solvency
requirement does not impose a constraint on the future values of
the sum  of  the public  sector's  primary  surplus  and  seignorage
revenue, essentially because the existing debt can be serviced by
the sale of new debt, rather than out of the public sector's own
resources.  On the other hand, when the rate of interest exceeds
the rate of growth of real GDP, the proceeds from the sale of new
debt at a constant debt/GDP ratio are not sufficient to service the
old debt, and the public sector  must service the debt using its own
resources  --  i.e.,  by  generating  sufficiently  large  primary
surpluses and seignorage revenue.  The solvency condition described
previously determines just how large the magnitudes of the future
resources  raised  by  these  means  must  be,  and  thus  acts  as  a
constraint on the Fresent value of future primary surpluses and
seignorage revenue.
b. Why a Debt Crisis ?
The immediate trigger for the debt crisis was a reversal in
the  relationship  between  the  "safe"  real  interest  rate  in
international capital  markets and the rate of growth of real GDP in
the HICs 8. During most of the decade of the seventies, the real
long-term rate of interest in the industrial countries fell well
short of the rate of real GDP growth registered by the HICs as a
7  See Cohen  (1985)  for a detailed discussion of the roles of
the real interest rate and the growth rate in imposing a solvency
constraint on sovereign borrowers.
8  See Sachs  (1985).
6group, as indicated  in Chart  19. Under these circumstances the
public sectors in  these economies could service their existing debt
through  new  borrowing,  without  the need  to generate  their  own
fiscal  resources  for  the  purpose.  The  absence  of  solvency
constraints on fiscal policy  in these countries was manifest  in
large fiscal deficits in  many of them during this period (Table  2).
This suggests that, for a large subset of the HICs, the origin of
the crisis is to be found in the public sector.  Based on Table 2,
obvious exceptions are Chile and Venezuela,  though Colombia also
experienced relatively small fiscal deficits, at least through the
end of the seventies.
At the  beginning of the new decade, tight monetary policies in
many  industrial  countries,  designed  to  combat  the  inflationary
consequences of the second oil shock, combined with expansionary
fiscal policies in the United States, reversed the relationship
between the real interest rate and the rate of growth of the HICs.
As shown in Chart 1, real long-term interest rates began to rise
substantially above the trend real rates of growth registered by
these countries.  Under these circumstances, servicing the existing
debt through new borrowing would have become  a Ponzi scheme, in
which  the debt/GDP ratio would  have prospectively  risen without
bound.  Creditors could not be expected to acquiesce in such a
scheme, since it would  imply that the present value  of the net
resource transfers that they would receive in return for their new
loans would fall short of the face value of such loans.  Thus the
public sector debtors in the HICs found it necessary to begin to
service debt with their own resources. This meant that the  previous
fiscal  performance could not be sustained. To  maintain the solvency
of  the public-sector  borrowers  in  these  countries,  a  credible
fiscal  adjustment  was  called  for that  offered  the prospect  of
generating  sufficient  resources  via  primary  surpluses  and
seignorage revenue to service the large stock of debt that had been
accumulated during the previous decade.
The severity of the adjustment problem confronting the public
sector in the HICs was magnified because in  many of these countries
the  public  sector  had  also  acquired  a  substantial  amount  of
domestic debt.  Table 3 indicates that in several of the highly-
indebted countries, including the  major external debtors  Argentina,
Brazil,  Mexico, and the Philippines, domestic debt contributed  more
than 10 percentage points of GDP to the total debt burden of the
public sector by 1982.  The relationship between the magnitude of
the adjustment burden and the size of the total outstanding gross
9  The real interest rate depicted in Chart  1 is the annual
average of the monthly series of real ex post annual yields on 30-
year  US  government  bonds  (IFS  line  61),  deflated  by  the  US
wholesale price index.  The average growth rates for the HICs are
from the IMF World Economic Outlook.
7Chart 1 World Real  Interest Rate
and Growth in the HICs
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-.1973  1975  1977  1979  1981  1983  1985  1987
1974  1976  1978  1980  1982  1984  1986
Years
-- w  Growth  Rate  ofHICs  - Real  InterestRateTable  2  Highly-Indebted Countries: Public Sector Deficit as a Percent  of GDP, 1974-1982
1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  Average
Argentina  8.1  15.1  11.7  4.7  6.5  6.5  7.5  13.3  15.1  9.8
Bolivia  -0.7  7.8  10.8  11.5  10.2  8.4  8.7  7.4  5.9  7.8
Brazil  1.0  4.1  5.3  3.9  7.2  13.3  12.2  3.9  5.9  6.3
Chile  5.5  2.1  -4.0  -0.4  -1.3  -4.6  -5.4  -0.3  3.9  -0.5
Colombia  0.9  -0.9  1.9  2.7  1.2  4.0  5.8  6.8  8.9  3.5
Cote d'lvoire  0.9  2.3  12.4  3.6  8.4  10.3  12.2  11.8  15.9  8.6
Ecuador  -0.8  2.2  3.3  8.3  6.2  2.0  4.6  5.6  6.7  4.2
Mexico  5.9  8.7  8.2  5.4  5.4  6.3  6.8  13.6  16.3  8.5
Morocco  3.9  9.5  18.1  15.8  11.3  10.1  9.0  13.6  9.2  11.2
Peru  6.9  9.8  10.1  9.7  6.1  1.1  4.7  8.4  9.3  7.3
Philippines  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  7.5  6.5  1.6
Venezuela  -20.3  -10.0  -6.3  1.6  3.3  -3.8  -4.4  -3.6  5.6  -4.2
Source: See  AppendixTable 3: Heavily  -ndebted  Countries: Ratio  of Public  Debt to GOP
1976  1982  1988
Foreign  Domestic  Total  Foreign  Domestic  Total  Foreign Domestic  Total Argentina  21.0  4.8  25.8  52.1  14.0  66.1  55.9  17.4  73.3 Bolivia  56.0  0.0  56.0  102.2  0.0  102.2  104.4  0.0  104.4 Brazil  19.3  8.2  27.5  27.7  16.2  43.9  30.1  18.9  49.0 Chile  45.9  0.6  46.6  61.9  1.6  63.5  79.6  6.8  86.4 Colombia  19.2  1.4  20.6  18.7  1.9  20.6  40.9  10.0  50.9 Cote d' Ivoire  30.2  3.2  33.3  88.1  3.2  91.3  123.5  6.4  129.8 Ecuador  16.9  0.1  17.0  47.9  0.0  47.9  98.1  0.0  98.1 Mexico  22.0  5.1  27.1  37.0  14.9  52.0  51.8  22.4  74.2 Morocco  25.5  21.6  47.1  71.1  23.1  94.2  93.2  31.2  124.4 Nigeria  1.8  1.8  3.6  11.4  12.0  23.4  107.2  20.6  127.8 Peru  40.2  8.8  49.1  34.9  2.4  37.3  76.5  3.1  79.6 Philippines  22.4  17.7  40.1  30.8  16.2  47.0  61.6  26.6  88.2 Uruguay  21.1  4.2  25.3  21.3  5.4  26.7  41.8  23.5  65.3 Venezuela  8.8  0.9  9.7  22.4  4.6  27.1  50.6  7.5  58.1 Yugoslavia  19.2  2.6  21.8  25.9  0.9  26.7  31.1  0.0  31.1
Source: Guidotti and Kumar  (1991), and World Debt Tables,  1991-92.debt can be given a more precise definition.  Let ps  denote the
"permanent"  primary  surplus  --  i.e.,  a  constant  value  of  the
primary surplus equal in present value to a given stream of future
primary surpluses.  Then, from equation (5),  solvency requires that
the permanent primary surplus be given by:
ps*=(r-n)dt-(phat+n)m*  (6)
where r and n are respectively the long-term real interest rate and
the economy's long-run real growth rate, phat is the "equilibrium"
rate of inflation chosen by policymakers, and m*  is the inverse of
base-money  velocity  corresponding  to  the  inflation  rate  phat.
Table 4 presents estimates of the permanent primary surplus as of
1982 for the fifteen HICs, together with the average level of the
primary surplus in each country during  the period preceding the
outbreak of the debt crisis. 10 The required permanent surplus
was  in excess  of  six percent of GDP  in five  cases: Argentina,
Bolivia,  Chile,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  and  Morocco.  In  the  cases  of
Bolivia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Morocco, this is due to a very large
stock of total debt relative to GDP.  For Argentina and Chile, it
reflects a combination of large debt  (in  excess of 60 percent of
GDP) and slow average growth registered over the period  (1968 to
1982) used to estimate the long-run growth rate.  Clearly, with the
exception  of Venezuela,  a  substantial  fiscal  adjustment  became
necessary  in  all  of  these  countries  to preserve  public  sector
solvency  when  international  interest  rates  rose  in  the  early
eighties.
The debt crisis essentially reflected the market's judgment
that the necessary fiscal adjustment was not forthcoming in  many of
the HICs.  Consider what happens when conditions change  (in some
unspecified manner) such that the solvency condition  (5), though
previously satisfied, now becomes violated ex ante.  Suppose, in
particular,  that the prospective permanent primary surplus falls
short  of  the value  indicated  by  equation  (6).  Under  the  new
conditions, the public sector  will be insolvent in an ex  ante sense
--  i.e., its comprehensive net worth will be negative.  The market,
however, will ensure that net worth will not be negative ex post.
Adjustment  can  take  several  forms.  If  the prospective  fiscal
program is unchanged, the public sector may be able to repudiate
enough of its domestic debt so as to leave the face value of its
remaining total debt  equal to what  it can expect  to service in
10  For the purpose of these estimates, the inflation rate was
taken as the lowest sustainable rate of inflation experienced by
these  countries during  1968-82, and the  estimate of base money
velocity  was  derived  from  that  associated  with  these  rates  of
inflation.
8Table 4 Heavily-indebted  Countries: Actual and Sustainable  Values
of the Primary  Surplus, 1982
(Percent  of GDP)
Actual  1/  Sustainable
Argentina  -7.6  7.3
Bolivia  -6.5  8.3
Brazil  -5.5  1.9
Chile  1.9  6.9
Colombia  -3.4  1.0
Cote d'lvoire  -7.3  6.7
Ecuador  -4.5  1.8
Mexico  -4.7  2.7
Morocco  -8.6  6.3
Nigeria  n.a.  2.2
Peru  -5.2  3.1
Philippines  -4.7  3.6
Uruguay  n.a.  2.6
Venezuela  2.6  1.9
Yugoslavia  n.a.  1.5
1/ For Argentina, Chile, Mexico,  and Peru  these are averages  for  1974-82.
For the Philippines,  the average  is for 1981-82 only. All remaining  countries
use averages  for the period 1976-82. Sources  of fiscal data are given  in the
appendix.present value terms under that program.' Failing this, the market
will simply value the debt at an amount equal to the discounted
value of the prospective debt service.  Since by assumption this is
less  than the  face value  of the debt,  the debt will  sell at a
discount.  The discount  is precisely  the shortfall between  the
present value of future primary surpluses plus seignorage revenues
and the face value of the debt.
When existing debt is selling  at a discount, the public sector
will be denied fresh funds.  To the extent that new loans cannot be
credibly assured a senior  status relative to existing debt,  new
credits would  immediately be  discounted  on a par with  existing
debt.  Thus, new lenders would not voluntarily enter the market.
While there may be incentives for existing creditors to increase
their  exposure,  they  would  not  do  so individually.' 2 Thus  the
absence of fiscal  adjustment resulted in the drying up of  voluntary
lending  --  i.e.,  the debt  crisis.
IV.  THE  NATURE OF  THE  FISCAL  RESPONSE
The substantial  discounts that have applied to developing-
country external debt since the secondary market  in these claims
arose in the mid-eighties thus suggests that the degree of fiscal
adjustment in response to the reversal in the relationship between
the external real interest rate and the long-term growth rate in
the indebted countries has indeed not been sufficient to restore
the solvency of the public sector in these countries.  In  prin-
ciple, the fiscal response can take many forms.  In the face of a
crisis, adjustment can be postponed as long as a class of creditors
can be found who can be induced (or forced) to supply financing.
Alternatively,  if  adjustment  is  not  postponed,  primary  public
sector deficits can be reduced through different types of spending
cuts and  revenue increases, or debt  service can be  financed by
increased reliance on the inflation tax.  Because these alternative
responses to the need for fiscal adjustment have very different
macroeconomic implications, the macroeconomic consequences of the
debt crisis for the debtor countries have largely been a function
of the nature of the fiscal response'.
As shown in  Table 5, the  net external resource transfer became
negative in many of the HICs after the onset of the debt crisis.
"  This could take the form of a once-for-all capital levy.
The  repudiation  option  is only available  for domestic debt,  of
course, since the domestic government has no legal means to compel
external creditors to surrender their claims.
12  See Krugman  (1988).
13 A recent exposition of this view can be found in Easterly
(1989).
9Tabie  5: Highly-.lndebt@d  Countries:  Response.  to the Debt  Crisis
Avg.  1970  1962  19S3  1984  1985  gs  ls  1987  198t Argentna
Resource  Transfer  0.9  4.3  -0.2  -2.6  -1.0  -2.9  . -2.0  -2.3 PrimaryDeficit  6.3  8.8  11.7  9.0  3.1  2.4  3.7  6.3 Public  Inv.  11.1  8.1  0.5  7.6  6.8  7.0  7.4 Inflatlon  193.4  164.8  343.8  626.7  672.1  90.1  131.3  343.0
Bolivia
ResourceTransfr  4.4  -0.7  -2.3  -1.4  -1.7  3.7  1.9  1.4 Primary  Deflit  8.2  5.4  4.6  3.0  4.9  11.0  9.4  -1.2 Public  Inv.  10.1  6.S  4.6  3.1  3.5  4.7  5.4 Inflaion  19.7  133.3  269.0  1281.4  11748.0  276.3  14.6  16.0
ResourceTransfer  1.3  0.2  0.3  0.9  -2.0  -1.6  -1.8  -2.3 Primary  Defioit  6.0  2.9  2.1  3.2  8.5  -2.8  -2.7  -4.0 Public  Inv.  10.4  8.7  6.4  6.0  6.2  6.2  6.9 Infladon  60.0  97.8  142.1  197.0  226.9  145.2  229.7  682.3
Chile
Resource  Transfer  -1.1  1.1  4.4  1.9  0.8  -3.1  -3.3  -0.4 Prlmary  Deflcit  -4.0  3.4  1.7  2.1  -0.3  -0.2  -2.8  -6.8 Publie  Inv.  6.2  4.8  4.9  6.3  6.9  7.0  6.9  7.5 Inflation  72.0  9.9  27.3  19.9  30.7  19.6  19.9  14.7
Colombia
Resource  Transfer  0.7  0.9  1.1  1.7  1.2  2.1  -3.2  -1.4 Primary  Deflcit  2.8  7.3  7.0  4.0  0.9  -2.7  -3.0  -3.4 Public  Inv.  7.2  9.4  8.9  9.0  9.0  8.6  7.9 Inflation  25.0  24.5  19.8  16.1  24.0  18.9  23.3  28.1
Cote  dtvolri
Resource  Transfr  6.6  6.4  -1.7  -1.6  -4.2  -6.0  ERR  ERR Primary  Deflcit  7.0  9.6  5.2  -4.7  8.5  -3.6  ERR  ERR Inflation  15.4  7.3  5.9  4.3  1.8  7.3  0.4  7.0
Ecuador
Resource  Transfer  3.7  -0.2  -2.0  -1.2  -1.8  1.0  0.9  0.2 Primary  Doflcit  3.1  2.2  -3.6  -0.2  -7.0  -0.8  7.2  2.2 Public  fnv.  9.7  9.0  7.9  6.4  6.6  8.6  8.4 Infladon  12.5  16.3  48.4  31.2  28.0  23.0  29.5  68.2
Mexico
Resource  Transfer  2.1  1.5  -3.0  -3.6  -3.7  -4.1  -1.2  -3.1 Primary  Deflcit  4.0  7.7  -4.4  -4.9  -3.9 Public  Inv.  9.8  10.4  7.6 4  7.1  7.0  6.1  5.4 Inflation  22.5  58.9  101.8  65.5  57.7  8a.2  131.8  114.2
Morocco
Resource  Transer  0.0  5.5  -0.4  3.7  0.5  0.9  1.1  -0.3 Primay  Deflcit  9.3  4.2  6.2  2.6  3.4  0.6  1.2  0.2
Infladon  10.2  10.5  6.2  12.4  7.7  8.7  2.7  2.4
Nigetia
Resource  Trandse  0.9  2.8  1.0  -1.7  -2.9  -0.9  1.6  -3.2 PrimeryDeflict  0.3  1.0  1.2  1.4  1.0  1.2  1.9  4.5 Publi Inv.  16.4  10.0  8.1  4.3  5.9  7.4  8.0  8.8 Inflaton  17.1  7.7  23.2  39.6  5.5  5.3  10.3  38.3
Peru
Resource  Trasfer  1.3  2.4  5.2  4.2  -0.1  0.1  0.6  0.4 PrimaryDeflcit  4.0  6.4  8o  1.8  -2.3  -0.0  -0.1  -0.2 Public  Inv.  7.0  10.4  10.4  9.5  7.3  8.3  6.0 Inflation  55.1  64.4  111.2  110.2  163.4  77.9  8t.8  667.0
Philippinee
Resource  Transhr  2.8  2.6  3.4  0.8  0.7  -1.7  -3.8  -3.8 Primay Deficit  0.0  4.2  1.8  -0.0  -1.5  0.3  -2.3  -2.2 Public  Inv.  7.3  7.5  6.4  4.5  3.0  3.2  3.1  3.7 Inflaton  12.5  10.2  10.0  50.3  23.1  0.8  3.8  8.8
Uruguay
Resoue Transfer  0.5  2.2  3.7  -42  -3.6  -2.0  -1.8  -2.9 Prlmary  Deflic"
Public  Inv.  6.4  7.2  4.1  4.1  3.0  2.9  3.1 Inflaton  53.0  19.0  492  55.3  72.2  76.4  63.6  62.2
Venezuela
Resource  Transdr  2.4  -1.4  -0.4  -3.5  -3.4  -4.4  -4.9  -2.5 Primary  Deflcit  -3.5  2.9  -3.3  -11.5  -7.7  -3.4  -3.9  -3.i Public  Inv.  14.4  10.5  14.6  7.7  9.0  12.4  12.6 Inflation  12.1  9.6  0.3  12.2  11.4  11.5  2a.1  20.5
Yugosiavia
Resource  Transr  0.4  -0.4  0.8  -0.9  -1.9  -3.0  -2.7  -2.1 Inflation  21.9  31.5  40.2  4.7  72.3  80.8  120.8  194.1
Source: Oata  on the  resource  transe are  from  the World  debt  Tables.  101-92. pubilc Investment  data  ur  taken  from  Pbefferman  and Madarassy  (1990),  and infladon  refrs  to  changes  in the  CPI  (IFS  line  64). Sources  of fll  data  are  given  in the appendix.Keeping  in mind  that  the  external debt  of  these  countries was
largely public, this suggests that the public sectors in the HICs
may have begun to service external debt partly  out of their own
resources.  Indeed, as also shown in  Table 5, increases in primary
public sector surpluses were widespread in these countries after
1982.  However,  as  indicated  above,  this  adjustment  was
insufficient to maintain the solvency of the public sector in most
cases.  There are at least two reasons for this.  First, though the
resource transfer became  negative  in many  cases,  debt  service
nevertheless fell short of the contracted amount, so that arrears
and  reschedulings became  common.  Second, the  financing of  the
resource transfer may have led to the perception  on the part of
creditors  that  even  such  transfers  as  were  achieved  were
unsustainable.
In particular, many countries relied on the inflation tax,
rather than the primary surplus, to finance debt service payments.
Table 5 indicates that the rate of inflation accelerated after 1982
in the majority  of the heavily-indebted  countries, particularly
those in Latin America (notable  Latin American exceptions are Chile
and Colombia).  Creditors may have been justifiably skeptical that
debtors were resigned to living with the assooiated high levels of
inflation forever
Moreover, to the extent that the primary surplus was indeed
increased, the  brunt of the  adjustment was often disproportionately
borne by public investment"5.  Among the heavily-indebted countries
for which the data was available, public investment fell during the
eighties  --  sometimes  drastically  --  in all but Chile  and Colombia
(Table 5).  Notice that, from the perspective of creditors, what
matters is the present value of all future primary surpluses, not
the  value  of  the  surplus  in  a  given  year.  Reducing  public
investment will indeed increase the surplus in a given year, but
can only increase the relevant present value measure to the extent
that the cash rate of return on investment is expected  to fall
short  of  the  discount  rate  --  i.e.,  to  the  extent  that  the
potential  investment  does not  meet  a  market  test.  While  many
potential  projects  in  indebted  countries  undoubtedly  fit  this
description,  it  remains  true  that,  as  long  as  the  canceled
investment  projects  are  not  pure  consumption,  the  short-run
increase  in the primary  surplus exceeds  its permanent  increase
under this mode of adjustment.
Finally, in several heavily-indebted countries, the shortfall
in external  funding was  partly  replaced by domestic  borrowing.
Easterly  (1989) documents the importance of this response in the
14  Further, a  number  of mechanisms  exist  through which  the
yield of the inflation tax may be eroded over time.
15  See  Easterly  (1989).
10cases of  Argentina, Brazil, Chile,  Mexico, Morocco, and Yugoslavia.
This  reliance  on  domestic  borrowing  partly  accounts  for  the
increase reported in  Table 2 of the share of domestic debt in total
public  sector  debt  for these  countries  between  1982  and  1988.
Notice that, to the extent that such debt was voluntarily acquired
by domestic residents, it  must either have been regarded as senior
to foreign debt or have been sold at a sufficiently high interest
rate as to offset the immediate discount on its face value.  1 6 In
either  case,  the  service of this debt  aggravates  the perceived
insolvency of the public  sector  from the standpoint of external
creditors.
When  fiscal  adjustment  is not  complete  and  claims  on  the
public sector sell at a discount under their original face value,
it becomes  a  matter  of macroeconomic  importance  how  creditors
handle their legal claims.  If creditors do not relinquish these
claims  (that  is, if debt is not written down), then the difference
between  the face value  of the debt and its current market value
remains  as  an  unresolved  claim  on  the  public  sector,  to  be
apportioned  in  an  uncertain  way  among  the  sector's  financial
creditors  (external and domestic) and domestic agents under  the
government's jurisdiction.  This means, in  particular, that further
fiscal adjustment, higher levels of inflation tax, and/or future
capital levies cannot be ruled out as a way to deal with this "debt
overhang".  In this setting, any assets within  the reach of the
fiscal  authority  in the indebted country are at risk of  future
confiscation  (e.g., through taxation or through a capital levy),
and all such assets consequently become impaired 1 7. As a result,
investors will demand high rates of return in order to be induced
to hold  claims  --  financial  or  real  --  on  the  affected  economy.
This implies that private investment will be low, domestic market-
determined real interest rates will be high, and, unless effective
capital controls are in place, capital flight can be expected to be
substantial.  18
Table  6  suggests  that  these  consequences  have  indeed
materialized  in  the  heavily-indebted  countries  in  the  period
16  See  Dooley  (1986).  In  many  countries,  however,  the
acquisition of domestic debt may have been involuntary, in the form
of required reserves held by private financial institutions.  In
this  case,  of  course,  the  degree  of  fiscal  "adjustment"  is
understated, since such reserve requirements amount to disguised
taxation of the financial system.
17  See Sachs  (1985)  and Dooley  (1986).
18  The  scope  for  effective  capital  controls  in  developing
countries is open to question.  Haque and Montiel  (1991)  present
evidence that  such  controls have been  largely ineffe-.tive  in a
large group of developing countries.
11following  the  outbreak  of  the  debt  crisis.  Since  the  early
eighties,  the HICs have undergone a prolonged experience  of low
private  investment  coupled with the substantial  accumulation of
external assets by domestic residents.  With the single exception
of Colombia, where the slowdown was milder, private investment fell
sharply in all the heavily-indebted countries for which data were
available  after  1982.  The  measure  of  private  capital  flight
employed in Table 6 is that which is suggested by the emphasis here
on the fiscal dimensions of the debt problem.  Taken from Dooley
and Stone (1991),  and based on Dooley (1988),  it  measures as flight
capital only  those private  capital outflows which  do not  remit
earnings, thus taking as motivation for the flight of capital the
desire  to evade prospective  domestic  taxation. By  this measure,
only Chile, Ecuador, and Uruguay escaped substantial episodes of
capital flight during this period.
V. THE BRADY PLAN AND FISCAL POLICY
These distortionary effects on the domestic economy, and their
implications  for  economic  growth  in  the  HICs,  provide  the
motivation  for  the  debt  and  debt  service  reduction  operations
(DDSR) embedded in the Brady Plan.  An evaluation of the likely
macroeconomic  implications  of  DDSR  operations  thus  requires
understanding how  these effects come about.  Three  conceptually
distinct mechanisms can be identified through which a large stock
of public debt could exert such effects on the domestic economy.
All of them, of course, are transmitted through the public sector's
budget.  In other words, they are all fiscal phenomena.
To clarify these channels of transmission, it is useful  to
first introduce some notation.  Let V,  denote the market value of
the public sector's external debt.  On the simplifying assumption
that domestic debt is zero, V,  is the present value of the public
sector's  expected  future  primary  surpluses  plus  seignorage
revenue:
19  The  role  of  domestic  debt  in what  follows  depends  on
whether external debt or domestic debt is treated as senior to the
other.  If domestic debt were senior, then the present value  of
expected payments to  domestic creditors would have to  be subtracted
from the right-hand side of equation  (7)  below.  If both types of
debt were of equal seniority, then the right-hand side of (7)  would
be multiplied by the share of external debt in total debt.  As it
stands, (7) is equivalent to treating external debt as senior.  To
avoid the straightforward, but tiresome, consideration of each of
these cases below, it is simplest to assume that domestic debt is
nonexistent.
12V,=PV(Ps,  +M^'m,, ;rt-n'e,  t)  (7)
The face value of the debt can then be decomposed into the portion
that corresponds to its market value and the "shortfall" D 1-V,:
Dt=  (Dt-Vt)  +Vt  (8)
Thus S,=D,-V,  is the present value of the "unallocated tax LIrden"
(Dooley (1986)) associated with the debt, while Vt  corresponds to
the portion of the repayment burden that domestic agents expect to
bear.
The first channel of transmission operates through  V,. A large
value of V,,  regardless of the size of St,  implies the expectation
of substantial future  primary surpluses  and/or seignorage revenues.
To  the  extent  that  these  are  generated  through  distortionary
taxation or reduced levels of productive public  expenditure  the
expected rate of return on domestic private asset accumulation will
fall, and the efficiency of domestic resource allocation will be
impaired. 21 Notice  that this effect  is present  even when  it is
confidently expected that the debt will be serviced fully  (i.e.,
when St  =  0).  In fact, in this case the effect appears precisely
because  full debt service is anticipated, but is expected to be
achieved  through distortionary means.  It is worth  noting that,
since lump-sum taxes do not exist, any service of preexisting debt
must be expected to be achieved through more or less distortionary
20  No attempt is made here to explain why the public sector
chooses to repay --i.e., why V,  is not zero.  The debt literature
contains extensive discussion of this issue, involving sanctions
available to external creditors permitting them to appropriate a
share of domestic income (see Sachs  (1984)).  It is assumed that,
to the extent that such sanctions fall on the private sector, the
political  system  ensures  that  they  are  internalized  by  the
government.
21  The observation  that an  increase in the stock  of public
sector debt implies future distortionary taxation is, in fact, a
commonly-made argument against Ricardian equivalence.
13Table 6 Heavily  Indebted Countries:  Private  Invedtment  and Private  Externl  Meets.  1-1988  Il
1980  1981  1ea  19U  1984  1906  19s  1987  188
Argentina
Private  External Aserte  14.0  23.2  31.2  31.1  33.0  35.2  33.1  30.7  36.4
Private Investment  13.0  9.4  8.9  7.9  6.9  8.8  0.0  6.8
Bolivia
Private  External Assets
Private Investment  7.3  3.8  5.0  2.0  1.0  3.0  4.0  4."
Brazil
Private External  Assets  7.2  9.6  6.9  5.8  12.3  8.2  16.7  31.9  23.0
Private  Investment  14.5  12.0  11.7  9.7  O.5  10.5  12.3  12.8
Chile
Private  Extemal  Assets  1.2  -1.4  -1.3  0.0  -0.7  -0.9  -2.0  -3.2  -0.0
Private  Investment  15.6  17.5  6.5  4.9  7.3  0.8  7.0  10.0  9.5
Colombia
Private  External  Assets  0.5  -0.1  -0.4  0.0  1.6  3.0  4.7  6.6  8.9
Private  Investment  11.4  12.0  11.1  11.0  10.0  9.4  0.3  11.1
Ecuador
Private External  Assets  3.8  3.0  2.8  3.0  3.8  3.8  4.0  4.1  3.8
Private Investment  14.1  11.7  13.0  8.6  9.0  9.5  9.8  14.0
Mexico
Private External  Aeets  16.3  22.9  24.8  36.2  36.3  37.7  42.0  52.3  35.6
Private  Investment  13.9  14.7  12.7  10.0  10.8  12.2  13.3  13.5
Nigeria
Private  Extemal Assets  6.2  3.3  0.8  3.4  4.2  8.0  13.1  21.0  22.0
Private  Investmen'
Peru
Private  External  Assots  3.5  2.3  3.6  2.4  2.7  4.2  5.5  0.8  6.4
Private  Investment  9.7  11.4  11.6  7.0  6.9  6.8  0.3  10.0
Philippines
Private  External  Assets  0.7  7.0  8.7  5.4  4.8  6.7  10.4  10.9  10.1
Private  Investment  18.4  18.5  18.1  18.8  14.5  11.4  9.7  10.6  12.5
Uruguay
Private  External Assets  -0.7  -1.1  -0.9  0.3  0.0  0.5  0.2  0.3  -0.3
Private  Investment  11.4  10.7  7.9  6.0  5.2  4.5  4.4  5.4
Venezuela
Private  External Assets  15.2  16.3  15.7  31.9  30.9  30.5  24.8  20.0  23.3
Private  Investment  13.0  9.8  7.7  4.5  6.6  0.6  6.8  6.6
I/Private external  assots  are in millions of US dollars,  while private investment  is the share of GOP.
Source:  Data on private extemal assets  are from Dooley  and Stone  (1901).
Private  mivestment  data are from Pfefferman  and Madarasy (1990).means. 22 The objective of public policy should be to minimize t17
distortionary effects associated with a given level of V,. This is
a standard problem in public finance.
When  the public  sector  is not  solvent,  these  effects  are
attached only to the portion of the debt that is expected to be
serviced.  The  remaining,  "debt overhang'  component,  does  not
generate such effects, because the public sector is not expected to
raise domestic resources to service it.
The preceding mechanism operates through the present value of
the anticipated future debt service associated with a large stock
of debt, and would be present even if  no debt service payments were
currently being made.  More generally, it is independent of the
time profile of actual debt service  payments.  The second  mechanism
depends on the timing of such payments.  For a given value of V,
when the public sector is insolvent  (i.e., when S,  >  0) the cost
imposed on the domestic economy of achieving the transfer V,  will
be greater the sooner the payments are made.  This is so because
when the public sector is insolvent, it will be unable to obtain
voluntary loans from individual creditors on  market terms.  In this
credit-rationed situation, the intertemporal discount rate used by
the public sector will exceed the risk-free market interest rate.
Thus any current debt service payments made by the public sector
will carry a high intertemporal opportunity cost --i.e., will be
more costly to the economy in terms of foregone public investment
opportunities  or distortionary  taxation  than payments  of equal
present value  (discounted  at creditors' costs of funds)  made later
on.  This separate liquidity effect arises, then, when insolvency
leads to credit rationing and is present even when debt service is
financed efficiently  (in the least distortionary fashion) by the
public sector.
As with the first mechanism described above, these liquidity
effects are aggravated when political or other constraints impede
the  efficient  financing  of  debt  service  payments.  The  actual
service of the debt requires the mobilization of resources, and
this can be achieved in more or less distortionary fashion --  for
example, by curtailing inefficient taxes or subsidies on the one
hand, versus levying high tax rates on a narrow base, on the other.
As indicated previously, reliance  on inefficient  modes of financing
negative net resource transfers  after 1982, such as the curtailment
22  Notice, in passing, that these arguments do not imply that
all public debt accumulation is harmful for growth.  To the extent
that  public borrowing finances investment that  meets a market test,
or  is  used  for  public  consumption  smoothing  in  response  to  a
transitory negative income shock,  the means  to service the debt
will be available in the future  without the necessity of increasing
the distortionary burden of taxation.
14of public investment and recourse to the inflation tax, may have
exerted  an  independent  effect  contributing  to  the  harmful
macroeconomic consequences of the debt crisis in the majority of
the HICs during the eighties.
A  third  and  conceptually  separate mechanism  also  becomes
operative when the public sector is insolvent, and is associated
with the "debt overhang" component St. Notice that this component
of the debt does not, unlike V,,  exert distortionary macroeconomic
effects by increasing the expected value of future taxes.  These
are already included in V,.  To see this at an intuitive level,
suppose  that  the  government  could  precommit  its  future  fiscal
program, so private agents face no uncertainty about their future
tax obligations.  In this setting, the level of expected future
taxes  and  the  debt  overhang  are  inversely  related--  i.e.,  the
higher the level of expected future taxes the lower the discount on
debt in the secondary market.  This is so because higher taxes on
domestic residents increase the primary surplus, thereby enhancing
the solvency of the public sector.  Under these circumstances, a
large  debt  overhang  --  a  substantial  discount  on  debt  in  the
secondary market --  suggests precisely that the anticipated future
tax burden  is low.  Implicitly, domestic  agents are  treated as
senior  claimants on public  sector  resources,  and  the burden  of
distortionary  domestic  taxes  is  eased  by  "taxing"  external
creditors.
Instead, the existence of a "shortfall" component of the debt
affects the domestic economy through two other channels.  The first
is familiar from the now rather extensive literature on the debt
overhang, and  is related  to the  incentives  facing policymakers
under  such circumstances.  For a given value of expected  future
debt  service vt, the effects on  the domestic  economy depend  on
whether Vt  arises  from the service of a  small  stock of debt  on
contractual terms  (so that Dt  = V,)  or from the expectation that a
larger stock of debt will only be serviced partially in some states
of  nature  (so Dt >  Vt).  Specifically,  in  the  presence  of  a
shortfall  (St  >  0), the actual  value  of  future debt  service  is
uncertain.  Since  the resources that creditors will be able  to
extract from the domestic public sector are likely to increase when
domestic  macroeconomic  outcomes  are  favorable,  creditors  will
capture some fraction of the payoff to good macroeconomic policies,
and this possibility acts as a tax on the returns to such policies,
thereby providing  a  disincentive discouraging policymakers  from
undertaking them.  In terms of our notation, the expected value of
this tax is already captured in Vt,  but the role of St  >  0 is to
introduce  a  distribution  for  the  actual  value  of  future  debt
service around V,.  The disincentive effect arises  from the fact
that  actual  debt  service  is  likely  to  increase  under  "good
policies", to a maximum of Dt.
Some simple calculations suggest, however, that the maximum
15value  of  the  potential  "additional  debt  overhang  tax"  on  the
dcmestic economy in the aggregate is likely to be small.  Letting
St= V/D,  denote the secondary market price of a dollar of debt, and
expressing the ratio of the primary surplus plus seignorage to GDP
as ps+Mm =(t-g), where t is the ratio of the present value of net
tax revenues plus seignorage to the present value of GDP and g is
the ratio of the present value of "exhaustive" (consumption plus
investment) public-sector spending to the present value of GDP, we
can now write equation (7)  as:
scDt;=  ( tt-gt;)  Yt:  9
where Y is the present value of GDP.  This can be expressed as:
gtYt+Dc=  ttYt+  (1 -st)  Dt  (10)
The  left-hand side of this expression represents the present value
of  the  public  sector's  "uses  of  funds"  (payment obligations),
consisting of the present value of its exhaustive spending program
and the face value of its debt.  The right-hand side represents its
"sources  of funds," consisting of net taxes (including  seignorage)
on domestic residents and its "taxation"  of creditors, in the form
of  debt-service  shortfalls.  Notice  that,  given  the  sector's
payment  obligations, an increase in the tax  rate t on domestic
agents reduces the shortfall  (1-s) and vice versa, as previously
indicated.
Finally, factoring out Y,  from the right-hand  side of  (10)
yields:
gtYt+Dt;=  [ tt+  (I-St)  yt]  yt  (11)
. t
The second term inside the square brackets on the right-hand side
represents the potential  "additional debt overhang tax rate" on
domestic  residents.  It is the portion  of  the public  sector's
payment obligation that is currently expected to fall on external
creditors.  It would do so, however, only if the portion  (1-st)  of
the debt is forgiven.  As long as this "shortfall" remains on the
books,  it  represents  an  unallocated  tax,  and  in  particular  a
potential tax on domestic economic activities.  Its size, however,
is not large.  Using fairly conservative estimates,  including a
16discount  rate  of  5  percent  (corresponding to  r-n)  for  GDP,  a
debt/GDP ratio of 0.6 (see Table 2), and a secondary market price
of 40 cents on the dollar, yields a representative potential "debt
overhang  tax"  on  domestic  residents  amounting  to  less  than  2
percent of the present value of GDP.
Detailed estimates of this tax for alternative values of r-n
are presented  in Table 7  for all the HICs with available  data.
The;se  estimates  are  based  on  end-1988 values  of  the  secondary
market  price  s, and  of  the  external  debt  to  GDP  ratio.  The
effective tax rate increases with  the real interest rate, which
reduces the present value  of  future domestic resources,  and  it
decreases with the growth rate of GDP.  Even with the relatively
high value  of 7 percent  for r-n, however, the tax rate reaches
maximum values amounting to about 6 1/2 percent of GDP only for the
extreme cases of small countries (Bolivia  and Cote d'Ivoire) where
the debt to GDP ratio is extremely high and debt is considered to
be  almost  worthless  on the  secondary market.  For  the  largest
debtors  (Brazil  and Mexico) the maximum "debt overhang" tax rate
is in the range of 1-2 percent of GDP.
The  extent  to  which  a  maximum  additional  loss  of  this
magnitude could provide a serious disincentive for the adoption of
otherwise  desirable  policies  is  certainly  open  to  question.
However, the fact that the maximum additional tax is small by no
means rules out disincentive effects on policymakers.  Among other
things, what ultimately matters is the marginal tax that creditors
are  able  to  impose  on  potential  in-reases in  domestic  income.
While the maximum additional tax may amount to a small fraction of
the present value of GDP, it may represent a large fraction of any
additions to GDP that could be secured through improved policies.
The existence of a potential additional debt overhang tax may
affect not just the incentives facing  policyrnakers,  but also those
facing private individuals.  Would the marginal tax that creditors
may  impose  on the economy  in the aggregate  --  and thus the marginal
tax  rate  that  may  confront  policymakers  --  discourage  the
undertaking  of  new  income-producing  activities  by  private
individuals ?  The answer to this question is probably not.  New
activities are unlikely to  be taxed differentially from old ones at
the  margin,  and  thus  can  be  expected  to  face  the  economywide
average tax rate.  While creditors  may extract  a high proportion of
the economy's increase in income, resulting in a high marginal tax
rate as perceived by policymakers, this burden would be borne by
new and old private activities alike through an increase in the
average tax rate applicable to both.  Even with a high marginal tax
rate extracted by creditors on increases in domestic income, the
change  in the economywide  average tax rate associated  with any
single domestic project is likely to prove infinitesimal, and thus
would  not  be  internalized by  private  agents  contemplating  new
activities.  It follows that the  "additional  debt overhang tax" is
17Table 7 Heavily Indebted  Countries: Implicit  Debt Overhang  Tax Rate
(in percent)
Values of (r-n)  7.00  5.00  3.00  1.00
Argentina  3.09  2.21  1.32  0.44
Bolivia  6.57  4.70  2.82  0.94
Brazil  1.26  0.90  0.54  0.18
Chile  2.40  1.71  1.03  0.34
Cote d' Ivoire  6.65  4.75  2.85  0.95
Ecuador  5.97  4.27  2.56  0.85
Mexico  2.07  1.48  0.89  0.30
Morocco  3.39  2.42  1.45  0.48
Peru  5.09  3.63  2.18  0.73
Philippines  2.20  1.57  0.94  0.31
Uruguay  1.17  0.84  0.50  0.17
Venezuela  2.09  1.49  0.90  0.30
Source: Underlying  data were provided  by the World Bank. Calculations  are
described  in the text.unlikely  to  prove  a  major  direct  source  of  disincentive  for
individual agents.  Thus  the standard  "debt overhang"  argument
applies to the behavior of policymakers, rather than to that of
individual agents.
While the  marginal tax rate applicable to new private economic
activities may not be made to differ from the economywide average
tax  rate  by  the potential  "additional debt  overhang  tax",  the
future value of this average domestic tax rate will be subject to
uncertainty an long as a "shortfall"  exists, and uncertainty about
future  taxes can itself  discourage new private economic activities.
The  figures  in Table  7  suggest  that  the  range  of prospective
variation  in the average tax rate associated with servicing the
"shortfall"  may not be large, but these numbers may understate the
degree  of uncertainty  involved for private  agents,  for several
reasons.  First, in the event of a breakdown in negotiations with
external creditors, the costs of sanctions to the domestic economy
may exceed the "shortfall".  Second, to the extent that a transfer
to  external  creditors  is  financed  inefficiently by  the public
sector, costs to domestic residents will exceed the value of the
transfer.  Finally, the  "micro" uncertainty  associated with tax
incidence  on  individual  activities  may  exceed  the  uncertainty
attached to the average tax rate.  This is so because, since the
shortfall is not expected to be serviced under the current policy
regime, the servicing  of this debt may  signal a  regime  switch,
involving new  taxes,  for example, as  part  of a  fiscal  reform.
Since the distribution of distortionary taxation in the new tax
policy  regime  would  be  difficult  to  foresee,  the potential  is
created for large individual losses, even when the change in the
average burden of taxation is not itself large.
The  additional  uncertainty  about  future  taxes  for private
domestic  agents  associated  with  the  shortfall  St represents  a
separate channel through  which S,  may adversely affect the domestic
economy, over and above any disincentive effects on policymakers.
In  the  presence  of  such  uncertainty,  irreversible  private
activities  such  as  investing  in physical  capital and  acquiring
claims  on  the  domestic  financial  system  (that  may  later  be
subjected to capital controls) are likely to  be postponed until the
uncertainty is resolved.  This effect may account for the behavior
of private  investment and capital flight in the HICs during the
early eighties."  Evidence has now accumulated that uncertainty
3  To attribute all of these dislocations to the "uncertainty
effect"  would, however,  undoubtedly be an overstatement, because it
would fail to take into account the possible role of the auality of
(partial)  fiscal adjustment undertaken by the HICs after 1982.  As
suggested previously, the  mode of fiscal  adjustment may have played
an  independent  role  in  generating  unfavorable  macroeconomic
outcomes.  Disentangling the direct debt overhang effects on the
18of this type can deter private economic activities that have an
irreversible aspect.>
On  this  reasoning,  the  costs  of  ex  ante  public  sector
insolvency per se (as  opposed to those arising from the  anticipated
servicing of the debt) arise from credit rationing as well as from
the distortions introduced into the decisions of both policymakers
and individual economic agents by the uncertainty associated with
the  shortfall  (in a  present  value  sense)  between  the  public
sector's resources and its obligations.
In this setting, DDSR operations, broadly defined to include
not just the financial operations associated with debt conversion,
but also the full range of macroeconomic  conditions attached  to
"Brady plan"-type operations, can make several contributions:
a. From the point of view of the debtor country, the first and most
obvious  contribution  would  be  to  reduce  the  present  value  of
anticipated future debt service payments, Vt. This would spare the
country not only  the burden  of effecting  the external  resource
transfer,  but  also  the  "secondary  burden"  associated  with
distortionary taxation.  Since doing so would benefit the residents
of the country concerned at the expense of external creditors, DDSR
operations  of  a  voluntary  nature  are  unlikely  to produce  this
result.  It  is  possible,  indeed,  that  the  fiscal  conditions
attached to the negotiated adjustment programs that precondition
"Brady  plan" DDSR operations could increase the value of  V,. Notice
that the effect  of  the operation on Vt  cannot  be inferred  from
secondary market prices alone  (since  such prices depend on both V,
and the face value of the debt D,),  nor from the immediate post-
operation market value of the debt (since  a portion of the payments
received  by  creditors  may  come  from  third-party  grants  or
concessional loans).  The effect on V,  must be extracted from the
post-operation value of the  debt (including  any up-front payments),
net of the grant element  (if  any) in third party contributions.
b. Given V,,  a  second potential  contribution of DDSR operations
would be to restrict the excess "secondary burden" associated with
the  financing  of  the  transfer  of  V, to  the  public  sector's
economies  of  the  highly-indebted  countries  from  the  indirect
effects transmitted through the mode of fiscal adjustment remains
an unfinished research task.
2  For the effects of potential taxation on capital flight
from  developing  countries,  see  Dooley  (1988).  A  theoretical
analysis  of  the  negative  effects  of  uncertainty  on  private
investment in developing countries is presented in Rodrik  (1991).
Bizer and Sichel (1988)  present empirical evidence on the existence
of irreversibility in private investment for the United States.
19creditors.  This  could  be  accomplished  through  the  fiscal
conditions attached to the adjustment program.  In  particular, such
conditions should seek to ensure that the transfer is effected at
minimum distortionary cost.  No single indicator would suffice to
measure  the degree  of success in this  regard, but  the relevant
broad public finance  principles are well known --e.g., promotion of
a tax system that relies on a broad base as well as low and uniform
tax rates, replacement of import  quotas by low and uniform tariffs,
protection of public investment that meets a market test, etc.
c. The ultimate goal of DDSR operations should be, of course, to
remove the debt overhang.  This removes  distortions associated with
credit  rationing,  as  well  as  disincentive  effects  on  both
policymakers and individual agents.  In fact, the most important
potential  contribution of DDSR operations may be to resolve the
allocational issue associated with the "unallocated  tax burden" and
to the greatest possible extent remove this source of uncertainty.
A reasonable single indicator of the success of such operations in
this regard, based on the reasoning above, may be the percentage
reduction  in the shortfall  (secondary market discount  times the
stock of outstanding debt) as a result of DDSR.
d. Finally, to the extent that a shortfall is expected to remain  at
the conclusion of a DDSR operation, the positive effects of the
operation from the standpoint of the debtor country will depend on
its cash-flow implications.
At the present time, five DDSR deals have been concluded under
the aegis of the Brady plan,  involving Costa Rica  ,  Mexico, the
Philippines, Uruguay, and Venezuela."  Among the four ways listed
above  that such operations could have contributed to easing  the
macroeconomic problems confronting these countries, the extent to
which  three  of  them  have  been  accomplished  can  be  directly
quantified.  These  are  the  change  in V,, the  reduction  in  the
shortfall,  and  the  change  in the  time profile  of debt  service
payments.  The extent to which the fiscal conditions attached to
the  macroeconomic  adjustment  programs  associated  with  DDSR
operations may offer the prospect of reducing the secondary burden
arising  from  the  financing  of  Vt is  much  more  difficult  to
ascertain.  It  requires  the  determination  of  a  fiscal
counterfactual in  each case, as well as both a detailed examination
of the fiscal conditions attached to each program and an assessment
of the likely effectiveness of conditionality in bringing  these
desired outcomes about.
Conceptually, the change in Vt can be measured as the change
in the market value of the total external debt plus any up-front
5  For information on the details of the individual deals see
Claessens, Diwan, and Fernandez-Arias (1992).
20cash  payments  minus  "new  money"  (whether  from  official  or
commercial sources) minus  grants  (or their equivalents, if any)
received  from  third  parties. 26 Several problems  arise  in
applying  this definition,  however.  Among  these,  two  are  most
important.  First,  official  debt  is not  traded  in a  secondary
market,  so the effect  of DDSR  operations  on the value  of both
existing and new official debt requires  making an assumption about
its seniority status relative to "eligible" commercial-bank medium
and long term debt.  Second, the ex ante market price of bank debt
cannot be unambiguously observed, since it has to be purged of the
effects of the anticipations of the operations.  The change in Vt
as a result of the DDSR operations in the five programs negotiated
so far has been estimated by Claessens, Diwan, and Fernandez-Arias
(1992).  Table 8 presents their estimates of the increase in V,  for
each  of  the  five  Brady  plan  countries  on  the  alternative
assumptions that official debt is senior and that commercial and
official debt are of equal seniority:
Table 8 Brady Plan Countries: Effects of DDSR
Operations on V,
(in  US $  millions)
Official  Equal
Debt Senior  Seniority
Costa Rica  193  907
Mexico  2,189  8,074
Philippines  451  3,112
Uruguay  53  392
Venezuela  2,444  5,345
Source: Claessens, Diwan, and Fernandez-Arias (1992).
The first column of this table assumes that official debt is not
subject  to  country  risk,  while  the  second  column  assumes  that
official and commercial debt are of equal seniority. Though  the
differences  between  the two columns are substancial, suggesting
26  Notice that, when measured in this way, an up-front payment
made out of the country's own resources would have no effect on Vt,
because the market value of the debt would fall by the amount of
the payment.  This reflects a reduction in the resources available
to service debt in the future.
21that the estimates are very  sensitive to this assumption,  these
results imply that Vt  increased in all cases.  While this would not
be surprising in the context of strictly voluntary debt exchanges
(see Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1991)), the Brady  plan  deals  contained
features intended to avert "free rider" problems and to give these
operations aspects of concertedness.  These outcomes imply, then,
that  commercial  banks  have  retained  a  substantial  amount  of
bargaining power.
Regardless of what happens to V,,  the arguments above indicate
that  the  reduction  of  the  shortfall  potentially  provides  an
independent  benefit to highly-indebted countries, by improving the
incentive structure facing policymakers and reducing the level of
uncertainty  for  private  agents.  Since  the  shortfall  is  the
difference between the face  value of the  debt and its market value,
it  can  be  reduced by  reducing  D, and/or  increasing  V,.  Since
effects on V,  have been discussed above, we now consider changes in
D,  , expressed as a fraction of the original shortfall in the five
Brady plan countries.  This information is presented in Table 9.
This table is constructed on the assumption that all external debt
is of equal seniority.  Thus the total shortfall is calculated in
the third column by multiplying the total stock of external debt
outstanding  at the time negotiations on DDSR were undertaken  in
each  of  the  five  countries  (column 1) by  the secondary  market
discount for medium and long-term commercial bank debt prevailing
at that time  (one minus the price of debt reported in column 2).
Column 4 presents  total net debt reduction in each of the five
countries  as  calculated  in  Fernandez-Arias  (1992).  This  is
expressed as a proportion of the original shortfall in the final
column.  Overall, net debt reduction as a percent of the original
shortfall was greatest in Costa Rica, and was negligible  in the
Philippines.  More importantly, total net debt reduction amounted
to a fifth or less of the original shortfall in four of the five
countries.
Combining Table 8 with the fourth column of Table  9, it is
obvious that the DDSR operations undertaken up to the present have
had limited aims.  In particular, they have not sought the complete
elimination of the shortfall.  The total shortfall, as given by the
third column of Table 9, has not been eliminated in any of the five
countries that have so far concluded DDSR operations.  The extent
to  which it has been reduced by reducing D 1, on the one hand, versus
increasing V,,  on the other, depends on which of the estimates of
the increase in V,  reported in Table 9 one adopts.  In view of the
limited scale of the operations, it is not surprising that the debt
of these countries continues to sell at a discount in the secondary
market, and that access to new voluntary credits has been restored
only  on  a  limited basis  and  only  in  the  cases  of Mexico  and
Venezuela.
In  this  vein,  the  time  profile  of  debt  service  payments
22Table  9 Brady-Plan  Countries:  Debt  Reduction  in DDSR  Operations
as  a Percent  of the Initial  Shortfall
Net  Debt  Debt  Reduction
Debt  Price  Shortfall  Reduction  as Percent  of Shortfall
Costa  Rica  4.8  0.56  2.1  1  47.3
Mexico  100.4  0.36  64.3  16.6  25.8
Philippines  29.4  0.46  15.9  0.5  3.1
Uruguay  3.6  0.36  2.3  0.7  30.4
Venezuela  34.8  0.3  24.4  4.3  17.7
Source:  Data  from  Fernandez-Arias  (1992)associated  with  these  operations  becomes  a  relevant  concern.
Unfortunately, as shown in Fernandez-Arias (1992),  using reasonable
counterfactuals each of these operations seems to have had adverse
liquidity effects over the first four years, with external payments
increasing in four of the five countries (the exception being the
Philippines)  during  the  first  year,  while  decreasing  only
moderately over the subsequent three years.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has argued that sectoral disaggregation within the
debtor  country  is  indispensable  in  analyzing  the  causes  and
consequences  of  the  international  debt  crisis,  as  well  as  in
evaluating prospective solutions.  Public-private disaggregation
within the debtor is important because, regardless of where they
originate, the nature of the political process tends to ensure that
severe financial crises are internalized by the public sector and
thus manifest  themselves in the form of public  sector  financial
difficulties. When the public sector is perceived to be insolvent,
distortions are introduced into the behavior of private agents  --
both  external  creditors  and domestic  residents  --  by the desire  to
avoid  future  "taxation", and these distortions can have adverse
macroeconomic effects.  In this context, aggregate current account
adjustment is neither necessary nor sufficient for the resolution
of debt problems, whereas a credible, sustainable fiscal  adjustment
that  allocates  the  losses  associated  with  the  crisis  in  an
efficient  manner--  and  thereby  restores  public  sector  solvency  --
is a sine aua non.
The debt crisis was triggered by a widespread perception that
the  public sectors in  many HICs were rendered effectively insolvent
in the changed international environment of the early eighties by
their large stocks of both external and domestic debts as well as
by  domestic  political  constraints  that  impeded  credible  fiscal
adjustment  to  the  new  circumstances.  The  crisis  had  severe
domestic macroeconomic repercussions in the debtor  countries, in
part  because  public-sector  insolvency  itself  has  direct
macroeconomic  consequences for the domestic  economy by  creating
disincentives to the  adoption of  appropriate adjustment policies as
well as by engendering uncertainty for  private agents.  In addition
to  this,  however,  the  drying  up  of  external  financing  due  to
insolvency resulted in  a liquidity crisis which required some form
of fiscal adjustment  as a matter  of accounting  necessity.  The
actual fiscal response to the liquidity aspects of the crisis --
involving increased reliance on domestic financing, the inflation
tax,  and  the  curtailment  of  public  investment  --  was  highly
inefficient  in many  countries,  leading to adverse macroeconomic
effects in the form of capital flight, low investment, and slow
growth, while resulting in  neither actual nor prospective full debt
service, leaving the problem  of insolvency  in place.  Both  the
ability  of  the public  sector  in many  countries  to  continue  to
borrow  at home after  external creditors had pulled  out and  the
23extent to which macroeconomic dislocations in the debtor countries
were  due  to direct  "debt overhang"  effects  rather  than  to the
nature  of the  fiscal  response  to the  liquidity aspects  of  the
crisis remain matters for future research.
Solutions  to  the  crisis  --  and  removal  of  its  harmful
macroeconomic effects --  must involve some combination of writing
down the face value of the debt and increasing prospective public
sector debt service at minimum distortionary cost to the domestic
economy.  Failing a restoration of solvency and renewed access to
the market  on voluntary terms, partial solutions should at least
mitigate the "secondary burden" associated with any given level of
public sector debt service and ease the liquidity problems facing
the indebted public sectors.  The DDSR programs so far implemented
under  the  Brady  plan  have  indeed  represented  only  partial
solutions,  closing without eliminating  the gap between the face
value of the external debt and the present value  of prospective
public sector debt service.  They have done so in part by reducing
the  former  and  in  part  by  increasing  the  latter.  Their
contribution  to  easing  the  immediate liquidity  problems  of  the
debtors, however, has not been encouraging.  The most  important
potential  contribution of such programs, then, may have been the
reduction,  through  the  policy  conditionality  associated  with
resources provided by the international financial institutions, of
the  secondaryf  burden  associated  with  the  internal  transfer  of
resources to the public sector.
27 As indicated above, it is unclear how much of this domestic
financing was the result of voluntary market transactions.
24APPENDIX:  SOURCES FOR  FISCAL  DATA
No single uniform source was available  for the fiscal data
used in this paper.  Country data was generally culled from  various
sources.  Sources  of  flow  fiscal  data  are  listed  below  for
individual countries:
1. Argentina
Overall public sector deficit and primary deficit are from
C. Rodriguez  (1991).
2. Bolivia
Overall public sector deficit is from Morales  (1986).  Primary
deficit was calculated by deducting external interest payments
as derived from World Bank  (1991).
3. Brazil
Overall public sector deficit is from Larrain and Selowsky
(1991).  Primary deficit was calculated by deducting external
interest payments as derived from World Bank (1991),  as well as
domestic interest payments estimated by applying a constant
interest rate of 5 percent to the stock data from Guidotti and
Kumar  (1991).
4. Chile
Overall public sector deficit and primary deficit are from
Marshall and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1991).
5. Colombia
Overall public sector deficit is from Easterly and Schmidt-
Hebbel  (1991).  Primary deficit was calculated by deducting
external interest payments as derived from World Bank  (1991),
as well as domestic interest payments estimated by applying a
constant interest rate of 5 percent to the stock data from
Guidotti and Kumar  (1991).
6. Cote d'Ivoire
Overall public sector deficit is from Easterly and Schmidt-
Hebbel  (1991).  Primary deficit was calculated by deducting
external interest payments as derived from World Bank  (1991),
as well as domestic interest payments estimated by applying a
constant interest rate of 5 percent to the stock data from
Guidotti and Kumar  (1991).
7. Ecuador
Overall public sector deficit is from Easterly and Schmidt-
Hebbel  (1991).  Primary deficit was calculated by deducting
external interest payments as derived from World Bank  (1991),
as well as domestic interest payments estimated by applying a
25constant interest rate of 5 percent to the stock data from
Guidotti and Kumar  (1991).
8. Mexico
Overall public sector deficit and primary deficit are from
Hierro and Sanguines  (1991).
9. Morocco
Overall public sector deficit is from Easterly and Schmidt-
Hebbel  (1991).  Primary deficit was calculated by deducting
external interest payments as derived from World Bank  (1991),
as well as domestic interest payments estimated by applying a
constant interest rate of 5 percent to the stock data from
Guidotti and Kumar  (1991).
10. Peru
Overall public sector deficit is from Paredes (1991).  Primary
deficit was calculated by deducting external interest payments
as derived from World Bank (1991),  as well as domestic interest
payments estimated by applying a constant interest rate of 5
percent to the stock data from Guidotti and Kumar  (1991).
11. Philippines
Overall public sector deficit is from Easterly and Schmidt-
Hebbel  (1991).  Primary deficit was calculated by deducting
external interest payments as derived from World Bank  (1991),
as well as domestic interest payments estimated by applying a
constant interest rate of 5 percent to the stock data from
Guidotti and Kumar  (1991).
12. Venezuela
Overall public sector deficit is from M. Rodriguez  (1991).
Primary deficit was calculated by deducting external interest
payments as derived from World Bank (1991),  as well as domestic
interest  payments estimated by applying a constant interest rate
of 5 percent to the stock data from Guidotti and Kumar  (1991).
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